TY  - GEN
TI  - Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
AB  - We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
UR  - https://epub.wu.ac.at/7507
PY  - 2020-01-01
AU  - Özkes, Ali 
AU  - Sanver, Remzi 
ER -