Özkes, Ali, Sanver, Remzi. 2020. Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited.
BibTeX
Abstract
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
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Status of publication | Published |
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Affiliation | WU |
Type of publication | Working/discussion paper, preprint |
Language | English |
Title | Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited |
Year | 2020 |
URL | https://epub.wu.ac.at/7507 |
JEL | D71, D72, D82 |
Associations
- People
- Özkes, Ali (Former researcher)
- External
- Sanver, Remzi (CNRS, France)
- Organization
- Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
- Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
- 1152 Game theory (Details)
- 5335 Political economic theory (Details)
- 5343 Economic theory (Details)