Okada, Isamu, Yamamoto, Hitoshi, Uchida, Satochi. 2020. Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern-Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity. Games. 11 (1)

RIS

@ARTICLE{Okada2020,
title = {Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern-Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity},
author = {Isamu Okada and Hitoshi Yamamoto and Satochi Uchida},
year = {2020},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010013},
url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/1/13},
volume = {11},
number = {1},
language = {EN},
journal = {Games},
abstract = {Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.},
}