Quotation Greiner, Ben, Grimm, Christine. 2017. Bargaining, Asymmetric information and Strategic Communication. ESA European Meeting, Vienna, Österreich, 06.09.-09.09.


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Abstract

Interactions between suppliers and buyers often face some asymmetric information. This holds potential for efficiency losses in markets that might be overcome by sharing information. In an Ultimatum Game context, we experimentally examines the strategic choice of communication with different reliability and its effects on efficiency and payoff distributions. We replicate previous findings that asymmetric information results in efficiency losses, and show that these losses affect both the informed and the uninformed parties. Communication leads to an improvement of the situation. However, reliable communication does not reach its full potential while cheap-talk communication also has an impact. Communication effects are asymmetric in that mostly proposers benefit from communication, be they informed or uninformed.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Bargaining, Asymmetric information and Strategic Communication
Event ESA European Meeting
Year 2017
Date 06.09.-09.09.
Country Austria
Location Vienna
URL http://esa2017.wu.ac.at/program.php#d1_s02_r08

Associations

People
Greiner, Ben (Details)
Grimm, Christine (Details)
Organization
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
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