Quotation Grimm, Christine. 2019. Strategic Manipulation of Contribution Information in Public Good Games with Punishment. Young Economist Meeting, Brno, Czech Republic, 10.06.-11.06.


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Abstract

The reliability of information holds the potential for considerably influencing decisions made by individuals. This comes with the ability to damage or to increase the efficiency of social groups. While former work focuses on exogenously induced misinformation and its impact on decision-making, this project adds to this literature by introducing an option of endogenous information manipulation in a cooperative context. The fundament of the experimental investigation is a Public Good Game with punishment. Different treatments cover options for manipulation of the public record and verification as well as two different approaches of punishment. By targeting the question when endogenous misinformation occurs and how to overcome it, the implications of the project can be manifold including but are not limited to Fake News in Social Media.

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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Strategic Manipulation of Contribution Information in Public Good Games with Punishment
Event Young Economist Meeting
Year 2019
Date 10.06.-11.06.
Country Czech Republic
Location Brno
URL https://yem2019.econ.muni.cz/

Associations

People
Grimm, Christine (Details)
Organization
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
Competence Center for Experimental Research WE (Details)
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