Quotation Spitzer, Florian. 2017. Product Testing in Markets for Experience Goods. European meeting of the Economic Science Association, Vienna, Österreich, 06.10.-09.10.




We examine the effectiveness of a product testing institution in a market for experience goods where reputation formation is not feasible. In our setup, sellers commit ex ante to a quality level (high or low). Buyers can - in addition to buying immediately and leaving the market - pay a fee to get a noisy signal about the quality chosen by the matched seller. We show the existence of a mixed perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which sellers provide high quality with positive probability, while buyers mix between buying immediately and acquiring information. We vary the cost of the signal such that the mixed equilibrium exists in a low-cost treatment but not in a high-cost treatment. The experimental results show that the low-cost signal improves efficiency, but not to the extent as predicted by theory. Surprisingly, the high-cost signal - which is predicted to have no effect - also improves efficiency compared to a control treatment where no signal is available.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Product Testing in Markets for Experience Goods
Event European meeting of the Economic Science Association
Year 2017
Date 06.10.-09.10.
Country Austria
Location Vienna
URL http://esa2017.wu.ac.at/


Spitzer, Florian (Former researcher)
Institute for Markets and Strategy IN (Details)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5311 Public finance (Details)
5953 Game theory (Details)
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