Quotation Reuter, Wolf Heinrich. 2015. National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with, but still effective? European Journal of Political Economy 39, 67-81.




This paper investigates the effects of (non-)compliance with national numerical fiscal rules on fiscal policy in 11 EU member states with 23 fiscal rules in place from 1994 to 2012. Introducing a new dataset of legal texts constituting the fiscal rules, allows a joint empirical analysis of different types and designs of numerical fiscal rules. In various empirical exercises the change in the difference between the exact variable constrained by the fiscal rule and its numerical limit is analysed. Statistics show that countries comply with their fiscal rules only in about 50% of the years. Nevertheless, various econometric exercises demonstrate that the introduction of fiscal rules does significantly change the behaviour of fiscal policy. If countries do not comply with their fiscal rule in the year or forecast before, there is a strong downward tendency of the constrained variable towards the numerical limit. The results show that fiscal rules act as kind of a benchmark for policy makers and the public, and even though they might be complied with only in half of the years, they still tilt fiscal policy towards the numerical limit in times of non-compliance.


Press 'enter' for creating the tag

Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Journal article
Journal European Journal of Political Economy
Citation Index SSCI
WU Journalrating 2009 A
WU-Journal-Rating new FIN-A, VW-C
Language English
Title National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with, but still effective?
Volume 39
Year 2015
Page from 67
Page to 81
Reviewed? Y
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.002
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.002


Reuter, Wolf Heinrich (Former researcher)
Department of Economics (Badinger) (Details)
Google Scholar: Search