Quotation Bunte, Jonas, Giray, Burak, Shea, Patrick. 2021. Selling Sovereignty: International Coercion, Debt Diplomacy, and Land Transactions. Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Boulder, Vereinigte Staaten/USA, 22.10.-23.10.




What if countries cannot repay their loans to other countries? Our study re-evaluates debt decisions in two important ways. First, we consider a debt management strategy yet to be considered in political economy research: repaying sovereign loans with land. Second, since our theoretical framework focuses on the distributional consequences of debt management for domestic groups, we model the interdependencies across policy choices. Using new data on land transactions, existing data on default, debt relief and austerity, and simultaneous equation estimation, we find that countries with influential financial groups address debt problems through austerity and land transactions to prevent default. In contrast, governments influenced by labor groups are less likely to implement austerity measures and tend to avoid land deals — but conversely are more likely to default. Our study sheds light on how debtor governments attempt to protect political sovereignty in a context of international pressure and debt diplomacy.


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Publication's profile

Status of publication Published
Affiliation WU
Type of publication Paper presented at an academic conference or symposium
Language English
Title Selling Sovereignty: International Coercion, Debt Diplomacy, and Land Transactions
Event Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society
Year 2021
Date 22.10.-23.10.
Country United States/USA
Location Boulder


Bunte, Jonas (Details)
Giray, Burak (University of Houston, United States/USA)
Shea, Patrick (University of Houston, United States/USA)
Institute for International Political Economy IN (Details)
Research areas (ÖSTAT Classification 'Statistik Austria')
5325 Political economics (Details)
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